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ARTICLE

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PARALYSIS:
RAMIFICATIONS FOR PANDEMIC PLANNING
R. GREGORY EVANS, PH.D., M.P.H.*
&
RACHEL D. SCHWARTZ, PH.D., M.S.**
INTRODUCTION
The anthrax mailings of 2001, recent terrorist attacks, disasters like
tsunamis and hurricanes, and the potential for emerging infections such at
H5N1 and H1N1 to become pandemic have led to significant developments
in the field of disaster preparedness and response as scientists, public health
officials, health care personnel, and governments realize that adequate preparation is the only way to meet these challenges. The U.S. government and
others have therefore placed a high priority on preparedness and response,
as have many public and private companies and organizations, designating
specialists to develop effective plans for them.1
In this paper, we discuss preparedness and response paralysis in the
context of the U.S. public health system, including factors and specific issues that contribute to paralysis, and its overall effect on preparedness. Our
intention is to develop a planning mechanism for quick and effective pandemic and bioterrorism response that will bypass obstacles encountered by
planners and responders, and that can be implemented well before an event
occurs.
The words “public health” describe, in the context of this paper, the
organized efforts of society to protect, promote, and restore people’s health.
It is the combination of science and skills directed toward the maintenance
and improvement of health through collective actions. Public health activities shift to accommodate variations in technology and social values, but the
* Professor and Chair, Department of Community Health; Director of the Institute for Biosecurity at Saint Louis University School of Public Health.
** Assistant Professor, Institute for Biosecurity and Disaster Preparedness, Saint Louis University School of Public Health.
1. Press Release, Bus. Wire, CDC Expands Existing Vaccine Distribution Partnership with
McKesson to Include H1N1 Flu Vaccine (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.businesswire.com/portal/
site/home/permalink/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20090810005445&newsLang=en.
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goal remains the same: to reduce the amount of disease, premature death,
and disease-produced discomfort and disability. To this end, public health
in the United States is made up of loosely affiliated local, state, and federal
agencies. While the state and federal health agencies will play a role in
responding to a bioterrorist attack, the initial response must come from the
local public health agency because it is crucial that the response be as rapid
as possible in order to minimize loss of life.2
The authors of this paper coined the term “preparedness and response
paralysis” to describe the point many planners reach where they find themselves lacking the resources, support, information, and leadership necessary
to continue developing a concrete and actionable plan that can be implemented in the face of a particular type of disaster. It is at this point that
many cease planning altogether, arguing that they must wait for further instructions from authorities like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or their own state governments. Others may continue, but only
at a very general level, producing plans that are difficult to understand, are
often unrealistic in their expectations of what resources and support are
available, and fail to give the kind of specific information needed for effective responses. Moreover, these plans rarely include the input of interested
stakeholders, without whose assistance no plan or response can be complete. Interested stakeholders include business people, emergency medical
technicians (EMTs), first responders, public health workers, and others who
would help create an actionable plan. Those who must try to respond to a
disaster based on an incomplete plan often deal with what the authors call
“response paralysis.” Because the plans are so poor, the responders are unable to react in a way that addresses the problems at hand, so they either fall
back on inappropriate but familiar strategies, or else give up entirely.
Two preparedness areas of particular concern to public health are bioterrorism and pandemic influenza. In the following section, we will provide an overview of bioterrorism, the agents most likely to be employed by
terrorists, and their characteristics and commonalities. We will also provide
an example of a simulated biological attack and the lessons to be learned
from it, as well as from past attacks. The following sections will include a
discussion of the obstacles to effective planning and response, as well as
briefly describe the structure of the U.S. public health system and some of
its weaknesses. This will provide background for a discussion of the ramifications these issues have for preparedness and response, and how they feed
into planning and response paralysis. We will conclude with recommendations for improving the current process of preparing for and responding to a
bioterrorist or naturally occurring pandemic.

2. R. Gregory Evans & Bruce W. Clements, Public Health Preparedness, in BIODEFENSE:
PRINCIPLES AND PATHOGENS 49 (Michael S. Bronze & Ronald A. Greenfield eds., 2005).
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BIOTERRORISM3
A review of the bioterrorist agents for which plans must be prepared
will provide good background for the discussion of preparedness and response paralysis. Furthermore, it will explain not only what we are faced
with, but how the characteristics of the agents may lead to a sense that
planning for them is beyond our capabilities, and that we gain little by pursuing sophisticated preparedness and response.
Terrorists can choose from among hundreds of lethal biological agents
to weaponize and unleash against any population they choose. That they
plan to make use of such weapons has long been established by global and
U.S. intelligence services, and supported with direct threats from terrorists
themselves, including a recent threat on an Al Qaeda video in which operatives spoke of their intention to smuggle bioweapons into the United States
through tunnels that run between Mexico and Texas.4 Such weapons may
have similarities that can assist us in planning, but they also can come in
many forms, including liquid or powder, and can be dispersed as aerosols in
a particle size specially tailored to enter the lungs and cause maximal damage.5 Particles can be aerosolized from a line or point source,6 either outdoors or indoors. Indoor delivery is more likely because it would give
terrorists more control, less agent would be needed, and environmental factors like wind, sun, and humidity, which can all reduce the effectiveness of
any biological agent, would not be factors.
Another common characteristic of many biological agents is that they
can be delivered in contaminated food or water. Food contamination is
somewhat easier to achieve than water contamination and, as we have recently seen, even small amounts of food like lettuce or peanuts that have
been naturally contaminated can cause injury and death, while frightening
consumers and producing serious economic consequences.7 Introducing a
biological agent into a large body of water such as a reservoir is a terrifying
scenario, but this kind of approach leads to significant dilution of the agent,
and the chlorination of U.S. water supplies kills most bacteriological
3. R. Gregory Evans et al., Terrorism from a Public Health Perspective, 323 AM. J. MED.
SCI. 291, 291–98 (2002).
4. Sara Carter, Al Qaeda Eyes Bio Attack from Mexico, WASH. TIMES, June 3, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/03/al-qaeda-eyes-bio-attack-via-mexicoborder/.
5. Michael S. Bronze et al., Viral Agents as Biological Weapons and Agents of Bioterrorism, 323 AM. J. MED. SCI. 316, 316–25 (2002).
6. A line source could be a plane, truck, or other vehicle moving through a city spraying a
biological agent. A point source is a stationary mechanism for the release of a biological agent,
such as an aerosolizing device placed in a building or a plastic bag that is punctured to release the
agent.
7. MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOTERRORISM 113–38
(Darra Goldstein, ed., 2003).
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agents.8 Nevertheless, those who manage the nation’s water supply are being alerted to possible attempts at intentional contamination.
In order to better understand the consequences of a bioterrorist attack
and to help determine complications that could occur with current preparedness plans, we worked with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to
model the release of five pounds of anthrax spores from the top of a building (point source) in downtown St. Louis, Missouri. Five pounds is a moderate amount of anthrax, particularly when compared to the two to three
ounces contained in the letter sent to Senator Daschle in 2001.9 Anthrax is a
naturally occurring disease that usually appears cutaneously (as a skin infection), though it can also be gastrointestinal; and it is often found among
people who work on farms or with animal skins.10 This kind of anthrax is
highly treatable and rarely lethal. The most lethal form of anthrax (mortality
45%–87%) is inhaled directly into the lungs, and is thus called inhalational.11 Inhalational anthrax almost never occurs naturally because the
spores needed to infect a victim must be aerosolized in a way which does
not occur naturally.12 Thus, even a single case of inhalation anthrax could
indicate a terrorist attack.
Once anthrax spores are inhaled and deposited in the alveolar spaces of
the lungs, they migrate to the mediastinum and begin to germinate and set
off a deadly infection.13 Although the incubation period is one to ten days,
treatment with antibiotics must begin as soon as possible or mortality will
increase.14 Indeed, the panic around the 2001 anthrax letters led to many
people being treated for the disease when they were not infected because of
fears that it would be missed and caught too late.15 At that point, poor communications among public health agencies, public spokespeople, the government, and media ultimately led to more confusion and terror than would
have occurred if an effective response plan had been in place—something
which, arguably, has not yet occurred, despite the passage of eight years
8. American Chemistry Council, Chlorine Chemistry: Essential2 Safer Water for 100 Years,
and Running. . ., http://www.americanchemistry.com/schlorine/sciencesec.asp?CID=1327&DID=
8248&CTYPEID=113 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
9. See Stephen Engelberg & Judith Miller, Daschle Letter Called First Use of Anthrax as
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/national/
17WEAP.html?scp=Dascj;e%20Letter%20Called%20First%20Use%20of%20Anthrax%20as%20
Weapon&st=cse.
10. Sirisanthana Thira & Arthur E. Brown, Anthrax of the Gastrointestinal Tract, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 649, 649–51 (2002).
11. Medline Plus, Inhalation Anthrax, May 30, 2009, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/imagepages/19058.htm.
12. John A. Jernigan et al., Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases
Reported in the United States, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933, 941 (2001).
13. ALAN L. MELNICK, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM EMERGENCY 14 (2008).
14. Thi-Sau Migone et al., Raxibacumab for the Treatment of Inhalational Anthrax, 361 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 135, 135-44 (2009).
15. MELNICK, supra note 13, at 14.
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and multiple reports and studies. At one point, there was even a shortage of
the appropriate antibiotic for treatment, as the public did not receive accurate information about who should be treated; response was a patchwork of
recommendations, warnings, and uncertainty.16 Such a response in reaction
to another agent could easily leave medical stores depleted and lead to paralysis in planning and response.
The five-pound bag of “anthrax” with which we created a theoretical
release could have been produced quite easily by one well-trained person or
group in a relatively small lab, as only a small proportion of the spores need
to be in the range of one to five microns in order to enter the lungs.17 On the
basis of this model, we calculated that approximately sixty-two thousand
individuals would be killed,18 and that number might be understated, since
it is assumed that two-thousand five hundred to fifty-five thousand anthrax
spores are required to cause disease.19 In fact, evidence from the mailed
anthrax attack suggests that fewer spores suffice for infectivity.
Mortality from such dispersal would be highly dependent on the rapid
distribution of antibiotics. Maximum antibiotic effectiveness in this case
would require the entire metropolitan population to be treated within as
little time as possible, since it would be impossible to know precisely who
had been exposed without a time-consuming and detailed analysis of exactly how wind and weather influenced dispersal patterns.20 A swift and
effective response could reduce mortality by 40–60 percent depending on
how quickly antibiotic stockpiles could be delivered to the area, how rapidly distribution sites could be set up, and how effectively a mechanism
could be implemented to provide transportation to those unable to get to the
distribution sites on their own.21 Most current bioterrorism plans lack the
detail, resources, and personnel to implement a response that could deliver
antibiotics to over 2.8 million people (the population of St. Louis county
added to the population of St. Louis proper) within one to three days.22
Moreover, even with successful rapid distribution of antibiotics, the mortal16. Elin Gursky et al., Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response, 1 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 97, 97–110 (2003).
17. Phillip S. Brachman et al., An Epidemic of Inhalation Anthrax: The First in the Twentieth
Century (pt. 2), 72 AM. J. HYGIENE 6, 16–19 (1960).
18. Authors’ calculation.
19. MELNICK, supra note 13, at 14.
20. See Medical News Today, Special Issue of Medical Decision Making Explores Bioterrorism and Disaster Preparedness, July 28, 2009, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/
159050.php.
21. See RedOrbit.com, Most Effective Anthrax Treatment: Rapid Diagnosis, Antibiotics and
Lung Drainage, VA-Stanford Study Finds, http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/398810/most_effective_anthrax_treatment_rapid_diagnosis_antibiotics_and_lung_drainage/index.html.
22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI
(2008), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND
COUNTY QUICKFACTS: ST. LOUIS CITY, MISSOURI (2008), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
29/29510.html.
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ity could be as high as 40–60 percent of the exposed population.23 This
would mean that any response plan would have to include provisions for
handling a large number of sick people in need of hospitalization, dead
bodies, and provisions for dealing with the psychological trauma experienced by family members and first responders. Any degree of preparedness
paralysis in such a situation would result in an increase in preventable
deaths.
BIOTERRORISM AGENTS
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has identified thirtyone potential agents that could be used in a biological attack.24 The United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases has reduced
this list to six primary agents, in part so as to make preparation and response easier, on the assumption that plans for all will be similar, if not the
same.25 This choice was based upon five criteria: availability of the agent,
ease of production, lethality, infectivity, and stability.26 Agents that have
high infectivity and lethality would be the most desirable to a terrorist because of their quick spread and high mortality. Stability would allow for
easier transport and dispersal of the weaponized materials by terrorists.
The six agents are subdivided into three categories. Category 1 agents
include anthrax and smallpox, Category 2 agents are plague and tularemia,
and Category 3 includes botulinum toxin and agents of viral hemorrhagic
fever.27 Category 1 agents rank the highest on a scale based on the criteria
provided by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Interestingly, this list predates the anthrax attacks of 2001,
and can be said to have correctly placed, if not predicted, anthrax as the
single most dangerous potential bioterror agent.
Smallpox is a Category 1 agent because it can be easily transmitted
person-to-person and has the potential for aerosolization; however, the
availability of the agent is quite low because the disease has been eradicated
and the only known samples of smallpox are stored in secured locations in
the United States and Russia. If a terrorist could procure a sample of smallpox and grow it in a laboratory, they could aerosolize a suspension of the
virus that could infect at very low doses. Infected individuals could then
infect others within seven to twelve days, and a full-scale epidemic might
23. Personal observation of authors.
24. CDC, Bioterrorism Agents / Diseases, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.
asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
25. U.S. MED. RESEARCH INST. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, USMRIID’S MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2004), available at http://www.usamriid.
army.mil/education/bluebookpdf/USAMRIID%20Blue%20Book%205th%20Edition.pdf [hereinafter USMRIID].
26. Id.
27. Id.
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ensue before public health authorities could respond.28 It is estimated that
the attack rate for unvaccinated contacts would be 25–40 percent with a
mortality rate of 30 percent or more among the infected.29
Recent research into the effectiveness of vaccinations given to people
in the 1970s (when smallpox was eradicated and vaccinations ceased) or
earlier indicates some possible element of residual protection from first vaccines.30 However, according to Steve Laurence M.D., the calculations based
on the most recent research suggest that first-time vaccination with “take”
(production of antibodies) provides five to ten years of solid protection,
with partial protection probably lasting twenty years or more.31 Secondtime vaccination provides an additional ten or more years of solid protection, with partial lifelong protection, while three or more vaccinations provide lifelong immunity for most people.
For the non-vaccinated who are exposed, the only known treatment is
vaccination within four to seven days of exposure, which may only be partially effective.32 As with the anthrax scenario, the need for this kind of
immediate response and the limited supply of vaccines would put great
pressure on public health systems. Assuming that adequate supplies of the
vaccine were available, a response mechanism would have to already be in
place to quickly requisition the vaccine from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and transport it to distribution centers. There, assuming a city
with the metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri (an area which contains
1.5 million people), skilled and trained vaccinators would have to be available to staff the centers in sufficient numbers to vaccinate 375,000 people a
day.33
In addition, responders would need detailed information to respond to
legal concerns, such as who is licensed to vaccinate during an emergency,
what to do given an estimated 40% absentee rate among those licensed, and
who decides if it is permissible to use a vaccine. For example, one of the
authors (RGE) participated in a smallpox exercise where school nurses
were faced with a smallpox pandemic and a school full of quarantined children. The nurses were required to decide whether to vaccinate the children
and protect them from the disease, or to wait until they could somehow
reach parents to obtain official parental permission. Having no plan or guidance, the nurses were unable to make a clear decision and kept waiting
until some higher authority, which never materialized, made the decision
28. Ira M. Longini, Jr. et al., Containing a Large Bioterrorist Smallpox Attack: A Computer
Simulation Approach, 11 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 98, 99 (2007).
29. Id.
30. Stephani Gallwitz et al., Smallpox: Residual Antibody after Vaccination, 41 J. CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY 4009, 4068–70 (2003).
31. Personal communication on June 3, 2009.
32. CDC, Smallpox Vaccination Overview, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
33. Authors’ calculation.
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for them. The result was that their paralysis prevented the vaccination of a
school full of vulnerable children. If they had been facing an actual outbreak, all the children would likely have been exposed and possibly infected, and many might have died. The public health simply cannot afford
such paralysis and abortive responses.
Another bioterror agent of concern is Yersinia pestis (plague).34 Plague
is a naturally occurring disease.35 In fact, two cases of bubonic plague and
one death were reported on June 4, 2009, in the United States, and are
believed to have been the result of flea bites.36 On average, ten to fifteen
people contract the disease from natural causes in the United States each
year.37 Treatment with antibiotics must begin as soon as possible and, if
timely, usually leads to complete recovery.38
Historically, there have been three recorded plague pandemics killing
more than 200 million people—most notably the Black Death epidemics in
fourteenth-century Europe.39 Prior to the 1950s, the plague organism had
been studied by Japan and the United States as a potential bioweapon.40 Its
least common, but most severe form, is primary pneumonic plague, which
carries an overall mortality of nearly 60 percent.41 Aerosolization, the most
likely form a terrorist attack would take, would probably cause the pneumonic form of the disease.42 But while mortality rates are high with plague,
they can be reduced substantially if antibiotic therapy is initiated within
eighteen to twenty-four hours of symptom onset.43 In a metropolitan area
the size of St. Louis, antibiotics would have to be distributed to all 1.5
million people within the first day. Therefore, yet again, response is only
effective if it is swift, organized, and accomplished with trained first
responders.
34. USAMRIID, supra note 25.
35. The Official Website of Santa Fe, New Mexico, Plague Warning, http://www.
santafenm.gov/index.aspx?NID=1794 (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
36. CDC Plague Homepage, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/plague/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2009).
37. CDC, DIVISION OF VECTOR-BORNE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, PLAGUE FACT SHEET 1–2
(2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/plague/resources/plagueFactSheet.pdf.
38. CDC, Plague Prevention and Control, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/plague/prevent.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
39. R. S. BRAY, ARMIES OF PESTILENCE: THE IMPACT OF DISEASE ON HISTORY 11–88 (Barnes
and Noble Books 2000) (1996).
40. CDC, History of Bioterrorism Podcast: Plague, http://www2a.cdc.gov/podcasts/
player.asp?f=5 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
41. R. Gregory Evans et al., Terrorism from a Public Health Perspective, 323 AM. J. MED.
SCI. 291, 295 (2002).
42. Raymond Gani & Steve Leach, Epidemiologic Determinants for Modeling Pneumonic
Plague Outbreaks, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 608 (2000).
43. USAMRIID, supra note 25; see also CDC, MORBIDTY AND MORTALITY REPORT
WEEKLY, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr4904.pdf (proposing a strategic
plan to prepare the United States for a chemical or biological terrorist attack).
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Francisella tularensis (tularemia) is another agent likely to be used by
bioterrorists, as it is, like anthrax and plague, naturally occurring and relatively easy to obtain.44 Six forms of tularemia are classified by clinical presentation and determined by route of exposure.45 The pneumonic form is the
most likely to be lethal, since it results from aerosolization of the bacteria
and has a 30–60 percent untreated mortality.46 While all forms of tularemia
are naturally occurring and can be contracted by contact with infected rodents or ticks or contaminated food, the organism was weaponized by the
United States, and possibly by other countries, prior to the termination of
bioweapon programs.47 Although there is a live attenuated vaccine available, it is not recommended for generalized post-exposure prophylaxis.48 Instead, as in the case of plague, antibiotic treatment must begin as soon as
possible after exposure.49 In the event of a massive attack, treating a large
population with ten to fourteen days of antibiotics would require vast supplies, and likely require that non-physicians be allowed to prescribe according to preset directions and training. The legal issues this could raise might
seriously slow response time and cost lives; thus, potential legal issues
should be resolved in advance.
Another bacterial agent of concern is Clostridium botulinum. Like anthrax, botulinum toxin was a major element of the Iraqi bioweapons program.50 As with the other biological agents, inhalation would be the most
likely route of exposure, but botulinum toxin could be used to contaminate
the food supply. The inhalational form is not seen naturally, and its presence is therefore a likely indication of bioterrorism.51 Since the inhalational
form of botulism has not been studied in humans, the case mortality rate is
not known, making it more difficult to prepare for and more likely to cause
terror and uncertainty that can lead to preparedness and response paralysis.52 In the event of a large scale attack using botulinum toxin, antitoxins
have to be obtained from the strategic national stockpile quickly because
every hour that passes without treatment—and with botulinum the treat-

44. CDC, Tularemia: Key Facts about Tularemia, http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/tularemia/
facts.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
45. Id.
46. David T. Dennis et al., Tularemia as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health
Management, 285 JAMA 2763, 2767 (2001).
47. CDC, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CDC, Botulism Facts for Health Care Providers, http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/botulism/hcpfacts.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
52. CDC, The History of Bioterrorism Video: Botulism, http://emergency.cdc.gov/training/
historyofbt/05botulism.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
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ment window is measured in hours, not days—increases the potential severity of the disease.53
If, for example, the toxins were introduced through contaminated food
at several restaurants, the antitoxin would need to be disbursed to potentially thousands of people. Moreover, the antitoxin will not prevent the disease; it will only reduce its severity.54 Thus, even after they have received
the antitoxin, many patients will require artificial ventilation, intensive care,
and other interventions.55 Planning must provide for access to hundreds, or
even thousands, of ventilators.56 If the attack occurred in multiple locations
throughout the United States, there would not be an adequate supply of
ventilators anywhere in this country, even including the ventilators stored in
the SNS.57 Many planners already assume that such an attack would leave
them with no choice but to accept what might otherwise be unacceptable
losses and prepare for difficult triage decisions.58 Other planners refuse to
accept that things will reach such a point and have not planned for it.59
Unless they change this approach and make realistic preparedness plans,
their failure to face reality will ultimately result in additional deaths.
The last agents on the list are the hemorrhagic fever viruses, of which
Ebola and Marburg are probably the most familiar examples.60 Naturally
occurring viral hemorrhagic fever is transmitted by contact with infected
blood or secretions.61 However, the airborne virus has been suspected of
causing disease in primates, and possibly in humans.62 Terrorists would
need to develop an aerosolized form of the virus to have an effective bioweapon.63 Treatment for hemorrhagic fever will be similar to treatment for
botulinum toxin, resulting in similar planning problems and the addition of
paralysis to the list of issues that must be overcome.64
53. CDC, Conference Call with William Bower: Overview of Bioterrorism Agents (Aug. 19,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/coca/summaries/BT-Agents081908.asp).
54. CDC, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Charles Kemp, Botulism Information Page, http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Charles_Kemp/
www/botulism.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
57. Id.
58. Personal observation of authors.
59. Personal observation of authors.
60. WHO, Haemorrhagic Fevers, Viral, http://www.who.int/topics/haemorrhagic_fevers_viral/en/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
61. CDC & WHO, INFECTION CONTROL FOR VIRAL HAEMORRHAGIC FEVERS IN THE AFRICAN
HEALTH CARE SETTING 3–4 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/
mnpages/vhfmanual/entire.pdf.
62. John King, M.D., Ebola Virus: Follow-up, E-MEDICINE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/
article/216288-followup (last updated Apr. 2, 2008).
63. Cagatay Ustun & Ozge Ozgurler, Ebola: A Significant Threat as an Infectious Disease,
and as a Potential Bioterrorism Agent, 35 TURKISH J. OF MED. SCI. 1, 3 (2005).
64. See USAMRIID, supra note 26.
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It is not necessary for terrorists to actually release a biological agent to
cause major disruption. In 1997, the mailroom at the B’nai B’rith offices in
Washington, D.C., received a leaking package that contained a Petri dish.65
It was early in our understanding of bioterrorist agents, and the first responders did not know that bacteria in a Petri dish is not a likely source of
exposure and does not require decontamination. In fact, security initially
called the bomb squad, thinking it was an explosive. As it turned out, this
was only a hoax, but in the process of discovering this fact, an entire city
block around the building was closed down, and terrified personnel suffered
the embarrassment of undergoing decontamination in public and waiting in
quarantine, fearing for their lives for nine hours until test results confirmed
the hoax.66 A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report on
the response pointed out a number of failures, but the Chief of Security for
the B’nai B’rith building, Carmen Fontana, simply said, “No one really
knew what to do.”67
Since the first actual anthrax-tainted letters were received in the Senate
on September 18, 2001, thousands of hoax mailings all across the country
have closed down schools, businesses, and government offices, resulting in
millions of dollars of expenses and lost revenue, and anxious citizens.68 If
effective plans had been in place to deal with such events, trained personnel
could have evaluated each situation and prevented unnecessary terror and
disruptive and misguided responses. However, such planning requires the
participation of all stakeholders and responders so that, rather than hoping
for the best, they can count on having experienced professionals directing
appropriate responses.
Another problem in response to bioterrorism is the lack of diligence
and training on the part of first responders. On a Saturday in March of
1997, seven hundred passengers arrived at Sun Harbor Airport in Phoenix,
Arizona, from Acapulco, Mexico.69 More than fifty of the passengers had
diarrhea.70 Emergency Medical Services offloaded twenty-five passengers
to ambulances, and six of them were admitted to a local hospital.71 County
health officers, who should have been informed immediately, only learned
of the event by listening to the radio Monday morning—a full two days
65. U.S. FIRE ADMIN., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO
BIOLOGICAL THREAT AT B’NAI B’RITH HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 4 (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.interfire.org/res_file/pdf/Tr-114.pdf.
66. Id. at 2–7.
67. LEONARD COLE, THE ANTHRAX LETTERS: A MEDICAL DETECTIVE STORY 164 (2003).
68. Bob Drogin, Anthrax Hoaxes Pile Up, as Does Their Cost, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009,
National Section.
69. Evans et al., supra note 3, at 295.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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after the flight had landed.72 By that time, all the victims had been released
from the hospital. There were no stool samples to determine what might
have caused the disease, and the airplane itself had been thoroughly cleaned. No one had even recorded the names of the sick passengers.73 Had the
outbreak been the result of a bioterrorist attack or an emerging infectious
disease instead of simple food poisoning, the public health service would
have been notified too late to mount an effective intervention. Indeed, any
infectious disease would have been widely spread as passengers caught
connecting flights and made their way home to families and friends. If, for
example, the passengers had been infected with H1N1, which is believed to
have originated in Mexico, the disease could have spread more quickly than
it has, and possibly claimed more lives.
It is entirely possible that the county health officers, if informed immediately, would have been in a position to respond quickly and effectively,
possibly using temporary quarantine, isolation, and tracking. However, the
first responders in this case were neither prepared nor trained, and they did
not contact the appropriate authorities. This kind of paralysis frequently occurs when all responders and stakeholders (including, in this case, airport
authorities) fail to work together to create and exercise a joint plan. When
an emergency occurs, lacking an effective and appropriate plan, they respond by default, doing what seems to them to be the most obvious. In this
case, the default response could have led to the spread of a bioterrorist agent
that caused a nationwide pandemic. This lapse of judgment would be less
likely to have occurred if an effective plan for such an emergency had already been in place, all parties had been familiar with the plan, and the plan
had been exercised.
The bombings of the World Trade Center and the mailing of anthrax
spores have provided us with many lessons. We know that terrorists can be
well organized, execute an attack employing dozens of individuals over an
extended period, and not be detected by current counter terrorism efforts.
Seeing themselves as martyrs, they are in a position to do extensive damage
and cause mass casualties in ways that the United States had not been accustomed to before 9/11. We cannot depend on past experiences with terrorism to predict what terrorists will do in the future, as they develop new
strategies and targets. Our best chance to minimize their effect is to create a
security and public health infrastructure that responds quickly and cooperatively, and communicates clearly and appropriately to everyone involved in
the actual response, as well as the public. This avoids confusion, unnecessary fear, and panic, and allows responders to do their jobs quickly and
according to exercised plans that will make the most of available resources
and personnel, rather than strengthen the hands of the terrorists by spread72. Id.
73. Id.
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ing a sense of helplessness. As we have learned, sometimes the hard way, if
good information and transparency in communicating to the public fail, the
authorities will lose the public’s trust, and that can lead to unwillingness to
follow instructions meant to save lives and property.
In 2007, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments concluded that, “[I]t is prudent to assume that, in the foreseeable future, one or
more terrorist groups will acquire the means to use biological weapons to
cause mass casualties, and be inclined to launch such an attack.”74 As we
have seen, such attacks are already in the planning stages among certain
terrorist groups, and our record of preparing for them effectively is poor at
best, leaving the entire nation vulnerable to bioterror attacks. Recognizing
this lack of cooperation in planning and response, and the failure to develop
and disseminate actionable information and direction, many have given up
on creating the kind of detailed and realistic plans that are needed in the
event of bioterrorism attacks. Such paralysis has already caused problems in
preparedness and response to other disasters and potential disasters. We
cannot afford to allow it to continue. Only when senior state and local officials, experts, businesspeople, first responders, and others work together
will effective plans be written—plans that will lead to better responses and
will lessen paralysis among responders.
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
A pandemic is a global outbreak of a new disease or a new subtype of
an existing disease. Seasonal epidemics of influenza are caused by subtypes
of influenza viruses that already circulate among people, whereas a pandemic outbreak is caused by a new subtype of the virus that has never circulated among people or has not done so for many years, leaving the majority
of the population vulnerable. A severe pandemic in which there are not
adequate controls could result in over 30 percent of the population infected,
ten million hospitalizations, and two million deaths.75 In addition, over 40
percent of the population might be unable or unwilling to work, and the
economic impact could be well over $260 billion.76 These estimates could
differ by tenfold depending on the virulence of the disease. In addition to
these challenges, a pandemic would strike health care workers and first responders as hard as or harder than the general population, reducing their
ability to work by 50 percent or more, leaving hospitals dangerously under74. ROBERT SHERMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, AVOIDING THE
PLAGUE: AN ASSESSMENT OF US PLANS AND FUNDING FOR COUNTERING BIOTERRORISM i (2007).
75. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FLU.GOV PANDEMIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS, http://www.flu.gov/professional/pandplan.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
76. INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPACT OF AN AVIAN
FLU PANDEMIC AND THE ROLE OF THE IMF (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/afp/2006/eng/022806.pdf.
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staffed and lacking resources, beds, equipment, and supplies needed to treat
the sick.77
Three twentieth century influenza pandemics have spread around the
world within a year of being detected.78 The most virulent was the 1918–19
Spanish Flu (A H1N1) that resulted in five-hundred thousand deaths in the
United States and forty million deaths worldwide over three successive
waves.79 Many of the deaths occurred within a few days after infection and
others were the result of secondary complications.80 Nearly half of those
who died were young, healthy adults, or pregnant women, as opposed to the
usual victims of a seasonal flu: the old and very young.81 Of the 116,000
troop casualties in WWI, forty-three thousand resulted from the Spanish
Flu, with a percentage dying of pneumonia.82 Hospitals were overcrowded
and unable to handle the majority of the ill people.83 Communities fell apart
as social, economic, and health problems devastated them. Many people
died of hunger because there was no one willing to bring them food, and the
dead went unburied or were interred in mass graves.84
Lessons from the Spanish Flu pandemic are still being applied today.
Cities that imposed social containment measures shortly after the first case
of flu was recorded reduced mortality by half compared to cities that waited
weeks to impose these controls or did nothing at all.85 Some of the more
successful measures instituted included closing theatres, churches, and
dance halls, despite pressure from businesses and the population to keep
them open. Some cities mandated staggering factory shifts to reduce rush
hour traffic, especially in trains and buses. Seattle’s mayor ordered residents to wear face masks.86
77. Balicer et al., Local Public Health Workers’ Perception Toward Responding to an Influenza Pandemic, 6 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 99 (2006).
78. Monica Schoch-Spana, Hospital’s Full-Up: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic, 116 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 32, 32 (2001).
79. Id.
80. See generally Arthur Schoenstadt, MD, Flu Complications, http://flu.emedtv.com/flu/flucomplications.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2006).
81. Jeffrey Taubenberger & David Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 12, 19 (2006).
82. NYGreene.com, War Years, http://www.nygreene.com/index.htm (last accessed Nov. 10,
2009).
83. Jim Duffy, The Blue Death – Flu Epidemic of 1918, MAG. JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG
SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Fall 2004), available at http://www.jhsph.edu/publichealthnews/magazine/
archive/Mag_Fall04/prologues/index.html.
84. See Jennifer Rosenberg, About.com Guide, 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic, http://history1900s.about.com/od/1910s/p/spanishflu.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009); Steve Inskeep, Host
of Morning Edition, NPR, Lesson Learned from the Great Influenza (May 5, 2009), http://www.
npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=103805839.
85. Martin C. J. Bootsma & Neil M. Ferguson, The Effect of Public Health Measures on the
1918 Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities, 104 PNAS 7588, 7588–89 (2007).
86. TRUST FOR AMERICAN’S HEALTH & THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA: WARNING, CHILDREN AT-RISK 10 (2007).
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In general, it appears that the more social distancing interventions imposed, the lower the mortality rates. Planners today must take this information into account in creating plans and explaining them to the general
public, so that if the plans must be implemented, people will understand
why and will comply, rather than resisting and making response less effective. As it stands, planners are by no means certain that recommendations of
social distancing would be followed by a majority of the population, especially without prior instruction and explanation, and enforcing such requirements would be difficult, if not impossible.
Two other pandemics struck the United States in the twentieth century.
The Hong Kong Flu (A H3N2) in 1968–69 resulted in thirty-four thousand
deaths (approximately the same as would be expected during a seasonal
flu).87 The Asian Flu of 1957–58 resulted in over seventy thousand deaths
in the United States.88 Three epidemics were also classified as pseudopandemics: one in 1947 with low death rates, one in 1977 that was pandemic in children, and a swine flu outbreak in 1976 that never developed,
but had pandemic potential.89 Thus, a pandemic could strike at any time.
Scientific evidence suggests that pandemics develop from changes in a
virus’s hemagglutinin (H) subtypes that arise from genetic reassortment
with animal influenza A viruses in a process called antigenic shift.90 Currently, there are two influenza viruses of special concern: H5N1 (Avian Flu)
and H1N1.91
The H5N1 has resulted in 423 cases worldwide with 262 deaths as of
June 2, 2009, and an average of 60 percent mortality.92 The first recorded
case was in 2003, and while there have been no recorded cases in the
United States, the disease continues to spread and has been especially virulent recently in Egypt and Indonesia.93
The H1N1 virus has reached a higher level on the World Health Organization’s pandemic alert stage (currently stage five), in large part because it has spread so quickly.94 This phase is characterized by human-to87. GlobalSecurity.org, 1968 Hong Kong Flu, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/
hsc-scen-3_pandemic-1968.htm# (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
88. Charlene Porter, Destruction of Asian Flu Virus Nearly Done, United Nations Says,
AMERICA.GOV, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April/20050415
154315cmretrop0.3807642.html.
89. David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination
Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 29–33 (Jan. 2006).
90. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Flu (Influenza): Antigenic Drift vs.
Antigenic Shift, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/Research/basic/AntigenicDriftShift.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
91. Pandemic Flu Watch, http://panfluwatch.blogspot.com/2009/05/h1n1-h5n1.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
92. WHO, Avian Influenza, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2009).
93. Id.
94. Martin Enserink, Swine Flu Outbreak: Worries About Africa as Pandemic Marches On,
325 SCI. 662, 662 (2009).
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human spread of the virus into at least two countries.95 Classification in this
stage is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to
finalize the organization, communication, and implementation of the
planned mitigation measures is short.96 As of June 5, 2009, sixty-nine countries had reported 21,940 laboratory-confirmed cases with 125 deaths. Mexico has reported 5,563 laboratory-confirmed cases including 103 deaths. In
the United States, there were 11,054 confirmed cases of H1N1 with seventeen deaths. However the CDC indicates that the actual number of cases is
much greater.97 Although the virus is spreading, the mortality is quite low,
making it seem, in the words of interim CDC director Richard Besser, “very
similar to seasonal flu.”98 There is, however, concern that a second wave of
the virus might occur with the beginning of the fall flu season, and that this
H1N1 might be more severe, having mutated over the summer months,
much as occurred with the 1918–19 Spanish Flu. Indeed, the flu might even
combine with the less contagious, but more lethal, H5N1 and create a more
dangerous disease.99
Like a terrorist-caused pandemic, a naturally occurring pandemic
could result in school and theater closings, disruption of communications
services, and hospital and healthcare facilities becoming overwhelmed. So
far, H1N1, though widespread, has resulted in only fifteen schools closures
in New York City, as well as closures in California and several other states,
and some relatively non-intrusive additional steps by public health and
medical agencies to increase preparedness.100 However, there has been significant uncertainty about how to deal with even this relatively mild pandemic, and many responders and planners argue that if this had been a
severe illness, plans and resources would have been inadequate.101
PLANNING

FOR

DISASTERS: ON WHOSE AUTHORITY?

In the cases of bioterrorism and the H5N1 and H1N1 viruses, public
health planners102 have been working to improve preparedness so they will
95. Id.
96. WHO, Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_
influenza/phase/en/ (last visited May 11, 2009).
97. CDC, Seasonal Influenza (Flu), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
98. The Medical News, Swine Flu Could Come Round Again, May 11, 2009, http://
www.news-medical.net/news/2009/05/11/49306.aspx.
99. Pandemic Flu Watch, supra note 91.
100. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ARCHIVED INFORMATION: H1N1 FLU & U.S.
SCHOOLS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=
cache:riZVPJZ6hZkJ:www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/guidance/flufaqs.pdf=+1n1+school+closures&hl=en&gl=us (last updated May 5, 2009).
101. Robert Roos, Analysis of H1N1 Flu Response Shows Progress, Problems, CENTER FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POLICY (CIDRAP), June 4, 2009, available at http://www.
cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/jun0409tfah-jw.html.
102. The authors use the term “planners” to describe a broad range of people involved in the
planning process at government and private organizations.
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be ready to respond in the event that a bioterrorist agent or either of these
viruses becomes easily transmissible from human to human, turns pandemic, or spawns a large-scale epidemic. These planners and the bodies
they represent naturally turn to their governments for guidance and information on how to proceed. They often find, however, that many of their
important questions go unanswered, or that the answers are changing and
sometimes inconsistent or contradictory, even among officials and experts
in the field. Indeed, anyone who reads the U.S. government’s own Pandemic Response Plan or Bioterrorism Response Plan will find it open to
interpretation at best, and a source of confusion at worst.103 The Pandemic
Response Plan lacks the specifics that local communities will require to
respond to a pandemic and does not adequately address the role of the medical community.104 Also, this planning guide was first released over three
years after it was recognized that the H5N1 virus could develop into a pandemic. Richard Serino, Chief of the Emergency Medical Services Department in Boston, indicated to the Senate Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and
Public Health Preparedness that the medical community was not adequately
incorporated into planning and training, saying that preparedness is so far
behind that stakeholders who should have already developed plans based on
mutual needs only “[trade] business cards at the scene of a disaster.”105 To
prevent this kind of situation, Serino argues that preparing for bioterrorism
and pandemics must be part of standard health care planning.
Faced, on the one hand, with uncertainty about subjects like the use of
personal protective equipment (type, efficacy, instructions, and so on); recommendations on stockpiling anti-virals; legal, social, and economic
ramifications of work and school closures; home health care recommendations; and vaccination priority lists, and, on the other hand, a reluctance of
government and public health officials to make concrete recommendations
and assume a leadership role, many organizations have slowed or even
stopped their planning and are simply waiting for definitive instruction
from the Federal Government, CDC, and scientists.106 Even those who soldier ahead produce plans that lack specificity and truly actionable
information.107
103. Christopher Lee, Federal Pandemic Plan Called Inadequate; Local Officials Point to
Stress on Hospitals, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2008, at A1.
104. Troy Anderson, U.S. Plans Inadequate For 1918-Type Pandemic: Doctors Say All
Health Systems Would Stumble, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.thefree
library.com/U.S.+PLANS+INADEQUATE+FOR+1918-TYPE+PANDEMIC+DOCTORS+SAY
+ALL+HEALTH. . .-a0137250317.
105. All-Hazards Medical Preparedness and Response: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 27–29 (2005) (statement of Richard Serino, Chief of Department, Boston
Emergency Medical Services).
106. Personal observation of authors.
107. Personal observation of authors.
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The authors call the situation described above a state of “preparedness
paralysis.” As more planners reach the limit of authoritative recommendations and feel unable to move forward, the planning process stagnates.
Those involved, however well-trained they are, cannot be expected to make
decisions on crucial medical, political, and legal issues that officials are
unwilling to make. This leads to failure to think creatively to address challenges. Networking and cooperation between planning bodies slows down,
and significant energy and funds are wasted as planning and preparedness
bodies scramble to justify their existence. Preparedness paralysis then leads
to response paralysis. If no effective and well-rehearsed plan is in place,
response is bound to be limited at best and counterproductive at worst.
In its January 2009 report, the House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security recognized that serious efforts were being made to prepare for pandemic outbreaks.108 However, the committee was forced to conclude that, despite these efforts, the United States is “not prepared as a
Nation to fully withstand the impact of . . . a devastating widespread biological event.”109 In fact, Peter Ginaitt, Director for Emergency Preparedness
at the Lifespan Hospital Network in Rhode Island, testified that regional
preparedness meetings were resulting in little more than checking the box
for the Department of Homeland Security as a way of acknowledging it was
an important resource, while he had to scrounge for extra supplies for the
hospital and fight for the small amounts of funding available for preparation.110 “[W]e need to get beyond getting ready,” Ginaitt insisted, highlighting the problems in a process that seems to progress very little, despite the
best efforts of many.111
Indeed, we have seen the same battle for preparedness and planning
resources going on all over the nation. Local, state, and federal organizations, and private agencies are finding themselves stuck in the “getting
ready” phase, unable to move beyond it for lack of support, instruction, and
definitive guidelines. This situation has led many to a state of preparedness
paralysis, as no forward progress can be made, and there is no reliable
source of leadership and information on which to depend. And while the
January 2009 report of the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security referred to pandemic preparedness without direct reference to
bioterrorism, the authors of this paper argue that there is little difference
between a pandemic caused naturally and one that results from intentional

108. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 110TH CONG., GETTING BEGETTING READY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2009), http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20090114124322-85263.pdf.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.

YOND
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release of an infectious disease.112 In fact, those preparing for both types of
pandemic are facing similar preparedness problems.
The following are some of the major problems recognized by the
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security in its final report, adapted for the purposes of this article to include bioterrorism and to
address the scope of the planning paralysis problem.
Early Warning and Detection Is Inadequate
In order for an effective response to be mounted against a pandemic, it
is crucial that accurate and timely information about disease status be transmitted to authorities, responders, and others. Unfortunately, the kind of surveillance necessary for this is not currently available in most of the country,
and what is in use is often incompatible across various systems. Moreover,
with different reporting requirements for health status in different states,
overlap and gaps remain serious problems.113
In addition, public health and hospital-based health systems report diseases at differing levels, so what might be considered an outbreak in one
state might not even be considered reportable in another. Varied levels of
training, most of them inadequate, compound confusion in attempts to coordinate responses, leading to a sense that nobody is actually in charge and
clear information is lacking. Furthermore, failures of biosurveillance at the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the CDC, and elsewhere, have led to a lack of
integration of disease data, without which, in the event of an outbreak,
timely tracking and adequate warning of a developing pandemic would be
nearly impossible.114
Execution of Key Planning Activities Is Incomplete
Largely due to the failure to include key stakeholders in planning,
many plans do not take into account vital response elements. For example,
what will happen in corrections facilities? How will bodies be dealt with?
What will happen to public transportation? What will happen to schools and
universities? When those who know the most about these fields are left out
of planning, specificity and actionability are weakened, and yet greater gaps
are left in response capabilities. This approach leads to overly general and
sometimes confusing guidelines for states, public and private agencies, and
individuals who rely upon uniform and definitive recommendations and instructions, increasing the likelihood of preparedness paralysis on all response levels. Only strong leadership can overcome this kind of
112. See id. at 2, n.14.
113. Id. at 6.
114. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 108, at 6.
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uncertainty, and it has not emerged so far in most jurisdictions or on the
federal level.
Challenges Posed by Key Medical Response Requirements Are Only
Partially Addressed
Because many difficult and specific issues have been left unaddressed
at the executive level, defining treatment priorities and determining access
to hospital resources have been hindered. Thus, it remains unclear who
would receive prophylaxis first, who would receive vaccines, and in what
order. Issues including an altered standard of care have been discussed but
not settled. The certainty that pharmaceuticals will be in short supply for
months, if not years, has not been adequately addressed. Nor have the options for non-pharmaceutical interventions like social distancing, standard
personal protective equipment (PPE) procedures, and closures of schools
and businesses been settled, and these will be the first line of defense
against a pandemic. Such decisions must be made using the best available
information in order to facilitate training and preparedness, and to avoid
confusion and response failure. If an event occurs which calls for a different
approach, that can be determined based on the available facts at the time.
However, waiting for an event to occur in order to make basic decisions
regarding major management issues undermines the entire preparedness and
response process.
Level of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza Is Unclear
Whether naturally occurring or engineered through intentional human
actions, we can be certain that pandemics will occur. Recent outbreaks of
SARS, H5N1, and even H1N1 have shown us that we are not prepared, and
have left many fearing that we can never be prepared. Too many questions
remain unanswered despite our having had the opportunity to test our response capabilities during these outbreaks. It is perhaps important to note
that there is no one point at which one reaches “total preparedness.” Certainly each event has its own context and agent, but our failure to learn from
the lessons of the most recent outbreaks must be met by U.S. leaders with
efforts to encourage preparedness through funding, example, research, and
communication. At this point, pandemic preparedness has been relegated to
a lower priority, with cuts in funding and personnel, while opportunities for
cooperation between federal agencies and executive branch departments
have not been taken seriously. The resultant lack of readiness speaks to a
state of paralysis at the highest levels of government and does not bode well
for overall response.
Recommendations by the Committee on Homeland Security arising
from these reported problems include:
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Establish Effective Management and Coordination
Executive leadership must visibly deal with preparedness issues and be
aware that its credibility and the nation’s preparedness levels are strongly
connected. A consistent system to receive, process, and disseminate reports
on disease status must be created across the nation. Accuracy and timeliness
of reports, and strong leadership will go a long way toward easing preparedness paralysis.
Address and Meet Key Medical Requirements
Overwhelming issues, which have often been ignored or set aside for
later, must now be dealt with directly. These include issues of triage, altered
standards of care, and vaccine and prophylaxis priority. They must also be
integrated into realistic and actionable plans that take into account actual
availability of resources and personnel.
Moreover, the issue of inadequate national capacity to produce vaccines and medical supplies in the face of a pandemic disaster must be addressed immediately to allow responders reliable access to whatever
resources are available. This is especially true at a time (as in pandemics)
when there are limited medical supplies on hand. One of the most problematic elements of preparedness paralysis is the certainty that not only is there
no treatment available for pandemics, but that even if it is developed, supplies will be so limited and so late to arrive that very few will have access
to them. Increased production capacity will help quell those fears and can
also be leveraged to play an important part in preventing deaths from seasonal influenza, which average around thirty-six thousand per year.
Evaluate and Update Plans
If the government is to require updated plans for states and local public
health agencies, among other institutions, the government itself must have
in place an updated national strategy for pandemic influenza that limits duplication among agencies and takes all the necessary stakeholders into account. Good communication between agencies on all levels must be
established now and exercised. A better understanding of how terrorists
might use a pandemic agent is needed, and plans must be arranged to cope
with such an event. In any type of pandemic outbreak, continuity of operations plans should be given high priority.
Improve Early Warning and Detection
Working in concert with the World Health Organization and other
agencies, the United States must develop and implement a uniform, global,
biological surveillance program to provide warning of suspicious incidents
or outbreaks. On the local level, the public must be educated using all
means necessary to ensure their effective response, increase their resilience,

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST304.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 22

15-JAN-10

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PARALYSIS

9:37

615

and prevent the planning paralysis that could leave them entirely vulnerable
to a pandemic event.
STRUCTURE

OF THE

U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM: RAMIFICATIONS
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

FOR

The fundamental structure of the U.S. public health system is one of
the primary causes for difficulties faced by pandemic preparedness planners. The United States Constitution and the political and historical record
of tension between federal and local authorities work against any strict enforcement of health laws from the federal level upon the state and local
authorities.115 Thus, unlike in China, where government response to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak could be focused and
directed at the national level, the U.S. public health system is not centralized.116 No single organization sets mandatory health policy. Each state and
local health department sets its own policies. Even the CDC, the federal
government’s public health arm, has little actual power to enforce or require
actions, but can, instead, only recommend and present guidelines to state
and local authorities, who will use this information as they see fit.117
An article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists states, “Of the many
ways in which the United States is unprepared to deal with an infectious
disease outbreak or bioterrorist attack, here’s one of the most problematic:
The responsibility for public health is a state concern.”118 The article’s authors go on to argue that this problem will likely result in an inefficient
piecemeal response during a multi-state event. The solution proposed by the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is to federalize the system
for a multi-state response.119 In this approach, the CDC would be required
to function along the lines of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
which has fifty-six field offices in large cities and over four hundred resident agencies in smaller cities and towns. The CDC would station highly
trained epidemiologists in field offices throughout the country who would
be able to provide broad coverage and a reliable feedback loop.120
Such a system might translate into public health as follows: in the
State of Missouri, 114 local public health agencies each produce their own
version of a preparedness plan based on the information made available to
them through the State Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS)
and the CDC. Yet, because this information is often so vague and non115. INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 125–26 (National Academy Press 1988).
116. Id. at 123–25.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Laura H. Kahn, Unifying the U.S. Government Response to Bioterrorism, BULL. OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (WEB–EDITION), Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/node/5137.
119. SHERMAN, supra note 74, at vii.
120. Kahn, supra note 118.
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directive, and so rarely addresses their specific needs—and because the
State is unable and unwilling to give answers to local agencies’ questions if
they have not been laid out by the CDC or another government body with
authority—the local agencies’ plans, if completed, do not address the needs
of the population or of responders.121 The presence of a local field office
would guarantee that guidelines, questions, and updated information could
be transmitted in both directions, clarifying needs and providing timely
updates.
This approach, if applied to a current disease, could make a significant
difference in preparedness response. In the case of Avian Flu, the CDC
distributed government dollars earmarked for preparedness at the local
level. But beyond making receipt of the funds contingent upon a few basic
requirements, like having some sort of local and state response plan and
arranging training exercises, the CDC has very limited influence over the
specific allocation and use of the funds.122 Moreover, because of federal
reluctance to be seen as dictating to state and local authorities, the CDC
avoids presenting concrete Avian Flu preparedness recommendations on
everything from stockpiling anti-virals to appropriate choice and use of personal protective equipment (PPE).123 Instead, it leaves important policy and
preparedness decisions up to the state and local entities, which as we have
seen feel unable to make such decisions without guidance.124
A field center could oversee the spending of federal dollars and make
recommendations about how such money could best be used. It could report
back to the federal government regarding actual needs and the funds required to meet them. The establishment of field centers might also make it
possible for the government to purchase supplies en masse for certain jurisdictions and thus provide specifically needed material like PPE, Tamiflu,
and hospital supplies, rather than simply giving large grants which might be
misspent by local agencies.
The current system, while leaving local agencies unencumbered by
government mandate, also leaves them without the information they need to
make important planning decisions, and increases the paralysis problem.
The problem is further compounded as federal, state, and local authorities
scramble to avoid being put into the position of making a decision that
might prove wrong, or leave them open to legal actions, loss of authority or
position, or other unpleasant consequences. During the 1918–19 Spanish
Flu pandemic, this situation meant that, when decisive action was needed to
121. Scott D. Holmberg et al., Policy Review: State Plans for Containment of Pandemic Influenza, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1414, 1416 (2006).
122. ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA FY10 APPROPRIATIONS (2009), available at http://www.astho.org/Advocacy/2009-Advocacy-Materials/
Pan-Flu-FY10-Appropriations-and-Stories/.
123. Personal observation of authors.
124. Personal observation of authors.
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prevent, contain, and treat disease, it fell to city mayors and local health
department directors to take decision-making responsibility upon themselves, closing schools, limiting public gatherings, and so on, solely on their
own authority.125 Those who moved quickly to institute social distancing
measures despite extensive resistance were more successful in limiting the
disease than those who did not.126
If any doubt remained about who would have the final authority to
make crucial decisions during an Avian Flu pandemic, recent statements by
the U.S. government have made it clear that most, if not all, preparedness
and response will be local.127 This provides all the more reason for CDC
representatives to be available at the local level.
PLANNING PARALYSIS: WAITING

FOR

GUIDANCE

In a Policy Review article published in the September 2006 Emerging
Infectious Diseases Journal, researchers examined forty-nine state pandemic
preparedness plans, assessing similarities and differences in a number of
areas including surveillance, vaccination priorities, and non-pharmaceutical
community interventions.128 In their findings, the researchers cite a lack of
explicit direction and clear guidance for states, lack of centralized coordination, and insufficient epidemiological information about flu itself as significant problems in the field of preparedness.129 The result, they note, is
“confusion and lack of specificity” in plans, fully two-thirds of which do
not explicitly address the basic strategies of self-quarantine or isolation of
affected adults.130 Others do not even provide basic recommendations for
social distancing, infection control, and containment.131
In addition to these difficulties, the authors would add that, in absence
of a successful track record in declaring a state of emergency in such situations, planners and responders are unable to take advantage of a potentially
helpful structure in the event of a pandemic: the state of emergency rules.
Recent disasters like Hurricanes Rita and Katrina serve as unfortunate reminders of how poorly the state of emergency rules are understood and how
ineffectively they are applied, leading to negative public reactions from victims who felt doubly victimized by the failures of local, state, and federal
agencies to assist them. The result is not better leadership, but increased
fear among legislators and planners of taking decisive steps that could en125. Harry Levins, What He Knew in 1918 Could Save Millions of Lives, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, July 9, 2006, at B1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Holmberg et al., supra note 121, at 1414.
129. Id. at 1415–16.
130. Id. at 1416.
131. Id.
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courage responsible decision-making and structured preparedness and
response.
Points of Preparedness Paralysis
The following two examples of how lack of adequate guidance and
direction have led to significant preparedness paralysis are by no means the
only points of paralysis in the planning process, but the authors have found
them to be major stumbling blocks to completion of successful pandemic
plans on a state and local level, and they are virtually universal.
As noted in the Policy Review article discussed above, one issue that
has been the cause of great confusion and failure is the use of “social distancing,” and in some cases, quarantine and isolation.132 In the absence of a
vaccine, and with limited supplies of anti-virals whose effectiveness is uncertain, social distancing is seen by most experts as a vital piece of the
arsenal available to contain or mitigate a pandemic.133 Social distancing,
however, cannot be recommended or imposed at the last minute. This strategy depends upon significant planning, coordination, training, and community education if it is to be used with any kind of success when a pandemic
strikes.
The social distancing decisions that need to be made well ahead of any
outbreak include: when and if schools should be closed, and for how long;
when and if public gathering should be banned in theaters, malls, and work
places; when and if rules regarding how many people can be in a store,
elevator, or subway car should be enforced; and how, if at all, quarantine
and isolation will be used or enforced. Plans that address these issues must,
of course, be flexible and should be regularly reviewed and updated, ideally
on the national level, as well as state and local levels, allowing for a more
coordinated approach among all responders.
Although the CDC’s Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance attempts to address these issues, it lacks the specificity that states require for
implementing these recommendations.134 The very terms “interim” and
“guidelines” (among others used) suggest an unwillingness to take responsibility for planning decisions. As a result, most state and local planners, if
they address these issues at all, do so indirectly. Using rubrics like “points
to consider,” they sidestep the actual decision, leaving it to whoever will be
willing to make it in the midst of the outbreak.135 Others suggest that the
decision will eventually be made by some authoritative body, and final decisions must be put off until that body, sometime in the future (again, pre132. Id.
133. Id.
134. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FLU.GOV COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION (Feb. 2007), http://www.pandemicflu.gov/professional/community/commitigation.html.
135. Authors’ comment.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST304.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 26

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PARALYSIS

15-JAN-10

9:37

619

sumably during an outbreak), will take the responsibility of decisionmaking upon itself.136
Another issue that causes significant problems for planners is the lack
of guidance on use and distribution of the preferred anti-viral medications:
neuromidinase inhibitors Zanmavir and Oseltamivir. So far, faced by high
costs, uncertain supply, and lack of evidence as to the effectiveness of these
drugs, some jurisdictions have even decided not to purchase them.137 As of
2006 (the last date such information was available), only 25 percent of
states planned to use or would “consider using” either chemoprophylaxis
(such as Oseltamivir) or vaccines (when they become available) to slow the
spread of the disease.138 Despite government-provided matching funds intended to encourage the purchase of anti-viral supplies, no actual recommendations have been made on how much, if any, to purchase, making it
less likely that states will do so.139
Among the most realistic approaches to dealing with pandemic and
emergency situations (and indeed, most likely to occur by sheer default) is
home health care by family members. Planners agree that, in the event of a
pandemic, hospitals and other health care facilities will be so overwhelmed
by the flood of sick people seeking care that they will be unable to function
except using altered (read “lowered”) standards of care.140 They will certainly not be able to admit most of the people who are ill, and thus much of
the care will fall to relatives and friends working and living in their homes.
Most of these cases will have no access to drugs, ventilators, or other basic
medical supplies. Yet, despite general agreement about this scenario, the
issue is not being addressed by government planners, and there are no algorithms or guidelines to assist families with making home health care decisions. In fact, families today have even less experience in dealing with sick
people at home than they did only a generation ago.141
The authors are well aware that epidemiological research is lacking on
questions like: How effective are N95 and other masks in preventing influenza transmission, and if they are effective, how and when should they be
used or stockpiled? How effective are anti-virals in treating/preventing disease? If employed, who should receive anti-virals and under what circum136. Authors’ observations and experience in the field.
137. GUY DANSIE & ROBERT ROLFS, GOVERNOR’S TASKFORCE FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS ISSUE BRIEF: STOCKPILING AND MANAGEMENT AND USE OF ANTIVIRAL MEDICATIONS DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 5–6 (2006), available at http://www.pandemicflu.utah.
gov/docs/IssuePaper-Antiviralstockpile12-4-06.doc.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Laura A. Stokowski, Ethical Dilemmas for Healthcare Professionals: Can We Avoid Influenza?, MEDSCAPE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, May 6, 2009, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/
702371_6.
141. SANDRA L. SCHWANBERG & MAURINE RENVILLE, PANDEMIC FLU HOME CARE 37 (2008),
available at http://www.pandemichomecare.com/files/2261183/uploaded/PFHCeBook09.15.08.
zip.
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stances? In order for any acceptable level of pandemic preparedness to
exist, even the most basic decisions must be made about these issues using
the information currently available. Algorithms must be available for distribution to families, including explanations of how to deal with fever and
how to manage someone with trouble breathing, as well as specific guidelines for drug usage and priorities in hospitals. If these and other issues are
ignored, mass mortality is almost a certainty. Therefore, despite a paucity of
information, concern about liability, and general unwillingness to take a
risk of being wrong, it is crucial that a mechanism for making such decisions be devised.
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REASONABLENESS:
A NEW APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING
Planning and response paralysis can only be addressed if public health
develops a process for decision-making that is based on evidence and that
all stakeholders find fair. This will require both a dedicated planning staff
and the involvement of committees made up of cross-sections of public
health and community stakeholders, augmented by external consultation as
needed. Planning staff, in consultation with experts, can organize the evidence, but the more difficult task is to use the evidence to arrive at
decisions.
Norman Daniels and James Sabin have developed a framework for decision-making that can be adapted to improve the pandemic planning process. The framework, called “accountability for reasonableness,” has been
used in both public and private hospital settings to establish priorities for
determining insurance coverage and for rationing scarce pharmaceuticals.142 According to accountability for reasonableness, decisions can be
considered fair if they satisfy four conditions. The authors have adapted
these conditions to pandemic planning:
1. Rationales for making decisions must be publicly accessible;
2. Rationales must be considered relevant and evidence based;
3. There must be a mechanism for appealing decisions and their
rationales;
4. There must be a means of ensuring that the first three conditions are met.143
This decision-making process will require health departments to establish committees that take responsibility for making specific recommendations to decision-makers concerning steps that should be taken to prepare
142. Norman Daniels & James Sabin, Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedure, Democratic
Deliberation and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303, 310–13 (1997);
Norman Daniels & James Sabin, Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care Reform, 17 HEALTH
AFF. 50, 55–61 (1998).
143. Douglas Martin et al., Fairness, Accountability for Reasonableness, and the Views of
Priority Setting Decision-Makers, 61 HEALTH POL. 279, 280 (2002).
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for and minimize the consequences of a pandemic. According to research
evaluating the decision-making process, the inclusion of “representatives
from multiple perspectives was the single most important element of fair
priority setting.”144 Thus, these committees must be made up of a crosssection of stakeholders with multiple perspectives and backgrounds, and led
by a committee chair who is skilled at working through the decision-making
process to arrive at a consensus, or if this is not possible, at least for the
committee members to accept the process as being fair and valid.
Trained leaders will have to make sure that all members have an opportunity to express views and have input into agenda setting. The process
should also be transparent, both internally and externally. Not only must the
committee be well-informed about the issues, but the deliberations, decisions, and reasoning of the committee must be made available to stakeholders external to the membership. Committee members must be honest with
each other, presenting all the facts with no hidden agendas and identifying
potential conflicts of interest. If a committee member strongly disagrees
with a recommendation, there should be an appeals process that allows a
recommendation to be reconsidered.
Application of a process that uses these four conditions may not necessarily lead to ideal outcomes; we cannot know challenges or outcomes
ahead of time, and success will require a great deal of advance work, as
well as education of the participants and the public regarding the way the
process works and why it is being used. The process will, however, allow
for decisions to be made and accepted through a system acknowledged as
equitable and reasonable, and which can provide confidence that the decision-makers themselves are operating according to best practices and available knowledge. Most importantly, the process allows its users to avoid the
planning paralysis that has, in so many cases, made it impossible to prepare
for disaster at all.

144. Id. at 283.

